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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAN BAKERf 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 920314-CA 
-vs- Trial Court No. 914902633DA 
LUJUANA BAKER, Priority Classification 16 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT to the above-captioned 
matter (hereinafter "defendant" or "wife"), by and through 
counsel, and hereby submits the following as her Brief of 
Appellant herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment herein, 
which is the Decree of Divorce, is vested in the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 
3 and 4, and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The matter below is a divorce action and this appeal is from 
the final Decree of Divorce and certain provisions of that Decree 
of Divorce, heard by the Third Judicial District Court, and, in 
particular, those provisions which awarded the marital residence 
and other real estate holdings of the parties to the plaintiff 
and which awarded alimony and child support and which divided the 
property and indebtedness of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Following are the issues presented on appeal by the 
defendant herein: 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
the sale of the marital residence and in not permitting the 
defendant and minor children to remain in the family home until 
the children reached the age of majority? 
B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making its 
determination and distribution of the mortgage obligation pending 
sale of the marital residence? 
C. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its 
determination of the amount of child support? 
D. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount 
of alimony awarded to the plaintiff? 
E. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the 
allocation of marital property and in fully recognizing an 
alleged debt to the plaintiff's parents? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES. ETC, 
There is no case law authority nor statutory authority 
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believed by defendant to be wholly dispositive or determinative 
of the issues raised on appeal in this case. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of 
discretion standard as to all issues. The trial court has broad 
discretion and so long as that discretion is exercised within the 
confines of proper legal standards as set by the appellate courts 
of the State of Utah, and so long as the facts and reasons for 
the decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the appellate court should not disturb 
the resulting order. 
The appellate court should review the factual findings of 
the trial judge under the "clearly erroneous" standard. A 
finding is "clearly erroneous" when "although there is evidence 
to support it, the review court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge David S. Young 
presiding, which, among other things, entered orders regarding 
child support, alimony, the disposition of the marital residence 
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and payment of the mortgage thereon, and the distribution of the 
marital estate. 
The Decree of Divorce from which the defendant appeals was 
signed and entered by the district court on April 16, 1992. A 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed in behalf of the defendant on 
or about May 12, 1992. 
The plaintiff, or husband, filed for divorce in the lower 
court. Responsive pleadings were filed and the matter came on 
for trial without a jury on March 26, 1992. The trial court 
ruled from the bench and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment and Decree of Divorce were prepared pursuant to 
that ruling, which were subsequently entered by the Court. (Said 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are 
attached hereto, designated as "Appendix A" and "Appendix B," 
respectively. 
Motions for a stay of the order of the trial court pending 
appeal were filed by defendant on May 12 and 22, 1992, pursuant 
to Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to relieve 
the defendant from the effects of the Decree of Divorce awarding 
plaintiff the real properties of the parties and oraering the 
immediate sale of the marital residence. Responsive pleadings 
were filed and the trial court, by minute entry and subsequent 
order, denied defendant's motion to stay. This motion is now 
pending before this Court at the time of drafting of this Brief 
of Appellant, but this motion clearly has no effect on the 
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pendency of this appeal, as it is not a motion pursuant to Rule 
50a or 50b or 52b or 54b or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married to each other on June 8, 1970. 
(FOF 1, index 87) The parties had three children born as their 
issue, two of whom were minors at the time of trial, namely: 
Camille Ann Baker, whose date of birth is January 5, 1983, and 
who is nine years of age; and Dannie Baker, whose date of birth 
is December 6, 1983 and who is eight years of age. (FOF 2, index 
87) The parties stipulated between themselves, at the time of 
trial, to settlement of numerous issues pending before the trial 
court, including, but not limited to, custody and visitation. 
Defendant was awarded the care, custody and control of the two 
minor children. (FOF 5, index 87) 
Defendant's monthly expenses total Five Thousand One Hundred 
Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00), which expenses include all 
expenses attendant to herself, her two children and two 
grandchildren who reside with her in the home. (FOF 8, index 88) 
The trial court specifically found that the expenses related to 
the two grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should they be 
considered in, the trial court's award of alimony and child 
support. (FOF 8, index 88) 
At the time of trial, defendant was unemployed, had no 
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income and had not worked since the end of the 1989/1990 school 
year. The defendant, however, is a trained and qualified teacher 
in good health and, while uncertified, can re-certify upon 
completion of three (3) academic hours of training. Defendant 
had worked during the majority of the marriage as a teacher or 
secretary. (FOF 7, index 88) 
Plaintiff is employed by Pacificorp (TR, p.29, 1.25) His 
annual gross compensation, including car allowance and 
anticipated bonuses, is One Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred 
Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00), and plaintiff has been the primary 
wage-earner during the marriage. The parties' incomes for the 
previous years, including bonuses and relocation reimbursement 
are as follows: 1990 - $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988-
$111,715; 1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149. (FOF 6, index 87,88) 
The pcirties' marital residence at 11718 Eureka Way in South 
Jordan, Utah was purchased by the parties in November of 1990 
(TR, p.52, 11.13,14) The parties stipulated that the residence 
had a value of One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars 
($183,000.00) at the time of trial and that the mortgage owing 
thereon was One Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Dollars 
($143,000.00) (TR, p.6., 11.6-10), thus leaving an equity of 
approximately Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00). The monthly 
mortgage obligation, including taxes and insurance, is 
approximately One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars 
($1,665.00). (FOF 17, index 92) 
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In addition to the marital residence, the parties 
accumulated and held at the time of trial the following assets: 
household furnishings and fixtures; 2-3/4 acres of land in Price, 
Utah; 1990 Ford Bronco (operated by defendant); 1989 Ford Bronco 
(operated by plaintiff); 1991 GMC truck (operated by 
plaintiff); two horses; tack for horses; U. S. Savings Bonds; and 
garden, power and hand tools. (FOF 13, index 90) At trial the 
plaintiff testified to the outstanding debts, and provided a 
statement of assets and liabilities and suggested division 
thereof, which is designated as "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1" received 
by the trial court as illustrative of his testimony and which 
exhibit, in its entirety, was adopted as the findings of the 
trial court as to the assets and outstanding debts and an 
equitable division thereof. (FOF 13, index 90) Those debts 
include debts on each of the vehicles, two debts entitled "K-Plus 
loan number 1" and "K-Plus loan number 2" which then totalled Two 
Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars ($2,688.00), a loan 
payable to Pacific Power totalling Six Thousand Seven Hundred 
Dollars ($6,700.00), a debt to Dr. Hicks in the sum of Five 
Hundred Sixty Dollars ($560.00), and a debt to Olivette Furniture 
for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00). In addition, set forth 
thereon is an item identified as "loan payable to plaintiff's 
parents" in the sum of Ninety-Four Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-
Nine Dollars ($94,389.00). (FOF 13, index 91) The total of 
outstanding debt, excluding the "loan payable to plaintiff's 
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parents" and the vehicle debt, is Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred 
Forty-Eight Dollars ($11,948.00). 
The trial court found that the item identified as a loan 
payable to plaintiff's parents in the amount of Ninety-Four 
Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Nine Dollars ($94,389.00) is a 
marital debt of the parties which must be considered in the 
division of the marital estate and which accordingly reduces the 
marital net worth of the parties to a negative net worth. Given 
that debt, the lower court, adopting plaintiff's suggested 
division of the marital estate, found that an equitable division 
of the marital estate required the award of one-half the 
furnishings and fixtures to defendant and the award of her 
vehicle, valued at Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00), with 
a debt of Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00) 
thereon. All other marital assets were awarded to plaintiff. 
(FOF 13,14, index 90,91) 
The trial court found that, because of the substantial debt 
of the parties, they could not afford to maintain the residence 
at 11718 Eureka Way and that the same must be sold at the 
earliest possible time, though the plaintiff was awarded said 
property and defendant was permitted temporary possession. (FOF 
17, index 93) The court also found that it was reasonable, 
pending sale, that defendant pay One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) 
of the monthly mortgage until October 1, 1992 and that the 
defendant pay the balance, and that if the home was not sold by 
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October 1 the defendant would pay the entire monthly mortgage 
obligation. (FOF 17, index 93) The court ordered that defendant 
would be fully responsible for the mortgage although plaintiff 
would be awarded that home, indicating "I want the parties to be 
motivated to sell the home so that they can get rid of that 
horrendous liability." (TR, p.116, 11.20-22) 
The trial court found that, based upon defendant's 
unemployment and plaintiff's current gross income of One Hundred 
Fifty Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00) per 
annum, or Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Ten Dollars ($12,510.00) 
per month, reasonable child support for the two children to be 
paid by plaintiff to defendant is One Thousand Six Hundred 
Dollars ($1,600.00) per month. "Plaintiff's income level exceeds 
the guideline amount set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-45-1, and the court finds One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($1,600.00) to be a reasonable sum." (FOF 9, index 89) 
The trial court found, given the plaintiff's current income 
and the defendant's unemployment, and given the debts and 
expenses of the parties, most of which were to be paid by 
plaintiff, and given the needs of plaintiff and defendant, that a 
reasonable amount of alimony to be paid by plaintiff to defendant 
was One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00) per month. 
(FOF 9, index 89) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred or abused its discretion when it 
ordered the sale of the marital residence. The defendant and the 
parties' two minor children and one of the parties' grandchildren 
had been residing in the home since November of 1990. The court, 
in finding that the parties could not afford to maintain and pay 
the mortgage payments of approximately One Thousand Six Hundred 
Sixty-Five Dollars ($1,665.00) per month, was in error in that 
findings of fact indicate otherwise. Plaintiff's monthly gross 
income was assessed at Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Ten Dollars 
($12,510.00) and plaintiff was ordered to pay child support and 
alimony to defendant at the rate of Three Thousand Dollars 
($3,000.00) per month. Further, the trial court specifically 
found that the defendant was an educated, trained and qualified 
teacher in the Utah public school system and had worked during 
the majority of the marriage and was anticipating becoming 
employed yet again, thus contributing further funds to her 
household to pay the mortgage obligation owing thereon. Adequate 
income and support was present to maintain that mortgage, thus 
permitting the children to remain in the marital residence, thus 
serving the best interests of the minor children. 
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the award 
of the mortgage payments and division of the same pending the 
sale of the marital residence. The court did not have before it 
any testimony or evidence to indicate that the defendant would 
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prevent the sale of the residence if ordered by the court, but 
ordered that if the residence was not sold by October 1, 1992 she 
would be required to pay all of the mortgage indebtedness owing 
on the property, even though the property and all equity therein 
was awarded to plaintiff. 
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the award 
of child support at the level of One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($1,600.00) per month. The court merely accepted the offer of 
plaintiff to pay that amount, without due consideration of the 
expenses attendant to the children and, therefore, their needs. 
The findings were inadequate regarding the appropriate level of 
support when the obligor's income exceeds the Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00) combined adjusted gross income set forth in 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7. 
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the award 
of alimony to defendant at the rate One Thousand Four Hundred 
Dollars ($1,400.00) per month. Given the findings of plaintiff's 
expenses and given the findings of the court that plaintiff's 
gross monthly income exceeded Twelve Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($12,500.00), and given the income history of the 
plaintiff and the parties and the standard of living enjoyed by 
the parties during their marriage, the findings were inadequate 
to support that award of One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars 
($1,400.00), particularly . Further, the court erred or abused 
its discretion in failing to consider the costs and expenses 
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associated with the plaintiff's care of the two minor 
grandchildren who were in defendant's care due to the acts and 
desires of plaintiff as well as defendant. 
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the 
division of the marital estate. Specifically, the court abused 
its discretion in fully recognizing the item designated as "loan 
payable to plaintiff's parents" which recognition caused the 
court to adopt the plaintiff's suggested division of assets and 
plaintiff was awarded all marital assets, except one-half the 
furnishings and one vehicle. The resulting award to plaintiff 
allows plaintiff to retain all equity in the marital residence, 
all equity in the parties' acreage in Price, Utah, two vehicles, 
two horses, all tack and items associated with the horses, all 
garden, power and hand tools, the U. S. Savings Bonds, and all 
funds in plaintiff's possession at the time of trial, excluding 
the 401(k) and pension funds, which were divided one-half to each 
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 12 THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR 
ERRED IN ORDERING THE SALE OF THE MARITAL 
RESIDENCE, THUS PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT AND 
MINOR CHILDREN FROM REMAINING IN THE FAMILY 
HOME. 
The trial court awarded the marital residence at 11718 South 
Eureka Way in South Jordan, Utah to the plaintiff, and ordered 
plaintiff to immediately list the same for sale with a real 
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estate broker. Pending the sale of the subject propertyf the 
defendant and the minor children were permitted to reside therein 
and care for and maintain the premises. (DOD 9, index 101) 
Though the defendant and minor children, including one of the 
grandchildren, had been residing in the residence since November 
of 1990, the court specifically found that because of the 
substantial debt of the parties and their resulting negative net 
worth, the parties could not afford to maintain and make the 
mortgage payments on the residence at 11718 South Eureka Way and 
that the same must be sold at the earliest possible time. (FOF 
17, index 93) 
At the time of trial, the plaintiff testified that, due to 
his work history, multiple moves had been required during the 
marriage. (TR, p.27, 11.21-23) The defendant testified that she 
and the children had been residing in the residence since 
November of 1990 and that the children had friends in the 
neighborhood and both minor children of the parties attended 
Monte Vista School, which is approximately four blocks from the 
home. (TR, p.63, 11.5-17) The defendant also testified that she 
would like to be able to raise the children in the marital 
residence because "I believe that they need the stability of not 
moving anymore in their life. Right now they are very worried 
about losing their home. I want them to grow up with friends 
like any other normal children in their area. They have piano 
teachers, dance teachers, classes they attend. So that is my 
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point in asking for the home." (TR, p.64, 11.1-8) The defendant 
testified that the children had lived in the parties' previously 
owned home in Price, Utah twice and lived in New Mexico once, and 
that with the move to the current marital residence it was the 
fourth move, and that the child, Camille, was only eight years 
old. (TR, p.63, 11.22-24) Further, the defendant proposed that 
the equity be divided fifty percent to each party at the time the 
house sold. (TR, p.64, 11.11-15) Defendant described the home 
as a comfortable home, which has a bedroom for each of the 
children and that "what's comfortable about it is that it is in 
the country and that it is the way I want the children to be 
brought up*" (TR, p.71, 11.17-19) 
As a general rule, courts have brought to bear their 
equitable power to provide for the welfare of children in divorce 
decrees. "Under its equity power to see that the welfare of the 
parties, and particularly the children, is best served, the court 
can take into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances." 
Wilkins v. Stout. 588 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah 1976) 
The defendant should be permitted to remain in the family 
home until the children reach the age of majority. "'The break 
up of their parents' marriage is . . . a severe trauma to young 
children; this additional physical and psychological dislocation 
[from the family home] should not be imposed upon them unless 
there is a very good reason indeed for doing so.'" Peterson v. 
Peterson, 784 P.2d 593, 594 (Utah App. 1988), citing Pino v. 
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Pino, 418 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) 
In Peterson, the Court of Appeals used its broad equitable 
powers to award a marital residence to the wife in order that the 
children's best interests be served. In Peterson, the husband 
and wife divorced after five years of marriage. The only 
property involved in the divorce was a three-bedroom house, land 
on which the house sat and a washer and dryer, all of which were 
brought into the marriage by the husband. The trial court 
awarded all of the property to the husband and allowed the wife 
to reside in the home with the child for a period of only six 
months. The wife, on appeal, argued that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in making this award. Reversing the trial 
court, the Court of Appeals looked first to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 30-3-5(1) (1987), which provides, "When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and parties." Id. at 594. 
The Court continued, "We construe Utah Code Annotated, Section 
30-3-5(1) to mean that not only may the parties' pre-marital 
property be subject to division by the court, but the court shall 
consider all of the circumstances of the parties determining the 
distribution of real and personal property, including the 
obligations of the parties of child and spousal support." Id. at 
595. The Court then concluded, "Allowing the children to remain 
in the family home would serve their emotional best interests by 
maintaining their roots and security and, thus, helping to 
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ameliorate the trauma of divorce." Id. at 596. While a primary 
reason for allowing the children to remain in the home in 
Peterson was the absence of any other resource in the husband's 
possession or control, the Court's concern for the stability and 
needs of the children was well articulated. 
The Court in Peterson relied on several cases from other 
jurisdictions for its holding. In Florence v. Florence, 400 
So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court awarded the 
"exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the wife 
remarries or the child reaches 18 or otherwise becomes 
emancipated." Id. at 1019. In that case, the marital residence 
had been purchased by the husband six months prior to the 
parties' marriage. 
In Pino. supra, the trial court granted the marital 
residence to the wife and children for a period of one year only. 
This meager allowance was based upon the court's opinion that the 
parties could not afford the home. The appellate court first 
explained that any accommodations, even remotely suitable for the 
children, would cost at least as much as the current mortgage 
payments on the home. Id. at 311. The court then examined the 
argument that selling the family home would allow the husband to 
pay off a large sum of outstanding debt. Responding to this 
assertion, the court opined that children should not be 
dislocated from the marital home absent a very good reason. Id. 
at 312. In the court's view, "indulging his desire to pay off 
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his obligations, however, cannot serve to justify the requirement 
that his children be uprooted from the home in which they have 
lived for almost all of their lives." Id. at 312. 
Again, in Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986), the wife challenged the decree of the trial court 
which failed to award her the exclusive occupancy of the marital 
home. Responding to the wife's argument, the court explained 
that "cases dealing with the issue whether the custodial parent 
should be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital 
home until the children reach majority or the parent remarries 
have almost without exception answered the question 
affirmatively." Id. at 1339. In support of this statement the 
appellate court offered an extensive string cite. The court 
concluded by once again awarding the wife exclusive occupancy of 
the marital home until the child attained the age of majority or 
was no longer dependent on his parents. Id. at 1340. 
It has long been the practice of the judges of the district 
courts in the State of Utah to award the custodial parent the use 
of the marital residence subject to a lien in favor of the non-
custodial parent representing one-half the equity, and subject to 
payment of that equity when the youngest child attained the age 
of majority or when the house was sold or when the custodial 
parent remarried or cohabited. This equitable division occurs 
with frequency, and with such frequency that the case law in Utah 
is sparse. However, the case law cited and statutory authority 
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cited supports the defendant's position that she should have been 
awarded the use and possession of the home subject to an 
equitable lien in the plaintiff and the "standard contingencies." 
In the instant case, the findings of the court reveal sufficient 
income to pay the mortgage obligation. While the mortgage 
payments are approximately One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Five 
Dollars ($1,665.00) per month, the trial court awarded child 
support and alimony at the rate of Three Thousand Dollars 
($3,000.00) per month. Further, the trial court specifically 
found that the defendant was an educated, trained and qualified 
teacher in the Utah public schools system and had worked during 
the majority of the marriage. It is evident from the findings 
that it was anticipated that the defendant would become employed 
yet again, and she testified that was her intention. (TR, p.70, 
11.4-6) It is obvious, therefore, that additional funds would be 
available to defendant to maintain the mortgage and other 
expenses. While defendant has appealed the trial court's awards 
of child support and alimony, even the sum of Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3,000.00) per month, when augmented by additional 
income, will allow the defendant to pay the mortgage obligation 
even though she may not be living in the standard to which she 
became accustomed during the marriage. 
As it is evident that there are sufficient funds to pay the 
mortgage obligation, the only question remaining is whether the 
general debt load of the parties was such that the sale of the 
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home is necessary- In order to answer that question, the Court 
need only look at the plaintiff's own testimony as set forth in 
"Plaintiff's Exhibit 2" which was received by the trial court 
into evidence. (TR, p.25, 11.19-24) A copy of that exhibit is 
appended hereto, designated as "Appendix C." 
That exhibit reveals plaintiff's suggested allocation of his 
income, which includes a purported Seven Hundred Fifty Dollar 
($750.00) monthly payment to Paul Baker, the alleged debt to his 
father. While the text of the document indicates that the 
monthly payment is Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00), the 
annual payments are indicated on the same document at the rate of 
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00), thus indicating a monthly 
payment of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) on that debt. That 
exhibit also includes payments on all other debts, both marital 
and personal car payments. The exhibit, on its face, relies upon 
plaintiff paying child support at the rate of One Thousand Six 
Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month, as was ordered by the 
trial court, and alimony at the rate of One Thousand Four Hundred 
Dollars ($1,400.00) per month, as was ordered by the trial court. 
The exhibit then shows that plaintiff will have net cash 
available to him, after payment of all of his debts, of Two 
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Four Dollars ($2,834.00) per month. 
Again, by plaintiff's own exhibit and testimony, adequate funds 
exist to maintain all debt, and the court erred or abused its 
discretion in finding that there were inadequate funds to pay the 
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mortgage and in then ordering the sale of the marital residence. 
As adequate* funds existed to pay the mortgage obligation as well 
as all other debts, the sale of the residence was not necessary, 
and it would serve the emotional best interests of the children 
in this matter to preserve their home and environment and prevent 
their physical and psychological dislocation. This Court should 
award the use and possession of the marital residence to the 
defendant until the children attain their majority or until the 
defendant's remarriage or cohabitation. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE 
DIVISION OF THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS PENDING 
SALE. 
The trial court ordered that, commencing with the month of 
April and continuing through the month of September 1992, or 
until the property was sold (whichever occurred first), the 
defendant was to pay One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) of the 
monthly mortgage obligation and the plaintiff was to pay the 
balance. The court further ordered that if the property was not 
sold by the end of September, the defendant was to make the full 
monthly mortgage payment commencing with the month of October and 
until the same was sold. (DOD 9, index 101) The court's only 
explanation as to that order and allocation of the debt was "I 
want the peirties to be motivated to sell the home so that they 
can get rid of that horrendous liability." (TR, p.116, 11.20-22) 
The court also reduced the alimony that plaintiff would pay to 
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defendant during the time that he was making contributions to the 
mortgage to the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars 
($1,200.00) per month. (DOD 5, index 99) The plaintiff had 
previously testified on direct that he had no objection to the 
defendant and the minor children remaining in the marital 
residence until its sale. It was his position, however, that she 
should pay the mortgage owing pending the sale of that property. 
(TR, p.17, 11.18-22) 
Nowhere in the evidence or testimony did there appear any 
indication that the defendant would obstruct or prevent the sale 
of the marital residence, warranting the trial court's order that 
the defendant should bear the entire mortgage payment if the home 
did not sell by October 1, 1992. Given that plaintiff's monthly 
income is in excess of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($12,500.00), and given that the defendant, at the time of trial, 
was unemployed, and given the trial court's award of child 
support and alimony at the rate of Three Thousand Dollars 
($3,000.00) per month, and given the defendant's monthly income 
and expenses, including the mortgage, of approximately Five 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00), that court 
order serves as a punishment of the defendant, rather than a 
motivation and was not supported by any evidence or findings of 
fact. Potentially, if the market failed to permit a timely sale 
of the property, the defendant would have to continue making the 
entire mortgage payment on an asset that the trial court awarded 
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to plaintiff, including all equity therein. If the Court finds 
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its 
award of the property to the plaintiff or the trial court's order 
that the home be sold, then this Court should order that the 
plaintiff continue to assist in the maintenance of the mortgage 
obligation until the home is sold. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT CHILD SUPPORT AT THE 
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($1,600.00) PER MONTH. 
The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay to defendant, 
as and for child support for the two minor children, the sum of 
One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month. That 
level of support was offered to be paid by plaintiff to defendant 
during his direct testimony and in "Plaintiff's Exhibit 2." (TR, 
p. 24, 11.1-3) Defendant testified that One Thousand Seven 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,750.00) would be necessary for the care 
of the children. (TR, p.84, 11.21 to p.85, 1.1) Prior to 
testifying to that need for support, the defendant testified as 
to her monthly income and expenses and offered "Defendant's 
Exhibit 5," which exhibit illustrated those expenses and which 
exhibit was received by the court. (TR, p.66, 11.13-20) A copy 
of "Defendant's Exhibit 5" is appended hereto, designated as 
"Appendix D." That exhibit reveals monthly expenses of Four 
Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars ($4,800.00), excluding defendant's 
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car payment, which is Three Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($396.00) 
per month, for a total monthly expense of Five Thousand One 
Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00). However, the mortgage 
payment listed thereon is approximately Seventy-Four Dollars 
($74.00) less than the actual monthly mortgage later testified to 
and as later found by the court. (TR, p.116, 11.6-9) 
The trial court, in awarding the One Thousand Six Hundred 
Dollars ($1,600.00) per month support found that, based upon the 
total gross compensation of the plaintiff of One Hundred Fifty 
Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00), and further 
premised and predicated upon the fact that defendant is currently 
unemployed and currently has no income, reasonable child support 
to be paid by plaintiff to defendant for the benefit of the two 
children is One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per 
month. The income level of the plaintiff exceeded the guideline 
amount set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-1 and the 
court found One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) to be a 
reasonable sum. (FOF 9, index 88-89) 
As plaintiff's income exceeds the highest level specified in 
Utah's child support obligation table, the court must order " 
an appropriate and just child support amount." See, Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45-7.12. That statute specifically states 
only that the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
highest level specified in the table for the number of children 
due support. In the instant case, there are two children and the 
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level set forth in the base combined child support obligation is 
One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00). See, Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45-7.14. 
An "appropriate and just" child support award requires an 
examination of the factors listed in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-45-7.3. Those relevant factors are listed as follows: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor and the 
child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the 
obligee for the support of others. 
An appropriate examination of each of those factors would be 
evidenced by findings entered by the court. See, Allred v. 
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990). In Allred, the Utah 
Court of Appeals discussed how a trial court should apply Section 
78-45-7. First, "[s]ection 78-45-7 requires the trial court to 
consider at least the seven factors listed . . . [and to] enter 
findings on all of the factors." Id. at 1111, citing Jefferies 
v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911. (Utah App. 1988) Second, the 
court's failure to enter findings is reversible error "unless the 
undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on 
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which the findings are missing," Allred, supra, at 1111. Third, 
adequate findings require sufficient detail to demonstrate the 
steps by which the court reached its ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue. Allred, supra, at 1111. 
The Utah Court of Appeals found that the trial court's 
findings in Allred were inadequate. The crux of this inadequacy 
was the trial court's failure to answer "the critical question of 
the total amount needed for Cory's monthly support." Allred, 
supra, at 1111. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals was unable to 
determine how the trial court reached its conclusions, other than 
through a figure "the parties previously stipulated." Allred, 
supra, at 1111. 
In the instant case, the findings of the court are 
inadequate. The court merely states that the level of support is 
reasonable, but there are no findings regarding the children's 
needs. The findings are inadequate in that they fail to 
demonstrate any of the steps by which the court did reach its 
ultimate conclusion and, pursuant to Allred, the failure of the 
court to enter findings is reversible error. 
While defendant requested support based upon a percentage 
formula (14% of the gross income of the plaintiff) there is 
nothing in our current statutory law which suggests that the 
trial court should use a mathematical continuation of the 
existing table. The trial court is required, however, by our 
statutory law as interpreted and discussed in Allred, to consider 
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the needs of the children and to carefully articulate the 
findings upon which the court's conclusion is based. Plaintiff 
did not articulate his reasoning for offering the One Thousand 
Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month child support award, 
and the court failed to detail or demonstrate its reasoning in 
the findings of the court. 
In addition to inadequate findings, the court's award of 
support is simply too low and not justified given the monthly 
needs and expenses of the plaintiff in caring for the children as 
testified to by her, and given the high income level of the 
plaintiff. As defendant's monthly expenses are in excess of Five 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00) and the trial 
court awarded alimony of One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars 
($1,400.00) per month, the defendant has a shortfall of Three 
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($3,796.00). Child 
support at the rate of One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($1,600.00) per month does not ameliorate that shortfall and the 
plaintiff still has net income available to him each molnth of 
over Two Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Dollars ($2,830.00). The 
needs of the children and the plaintiff's ability to pay was 
simply not considered by the court and the amount ordered is 
insufficient and an abuse of discretion. 
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ONE THOUSAND FOUR 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,400.00) PER MONTH AS 
ALIMONY CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE INADEQUATE TO 
SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD AND THE ALIMONY AWARD IS 
INADEQUATE. 
The trial court awarded the defendant the sum of One 
Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400-00) per month as and for 
alimony, after the sale of the marital residence or commencing 
with October 1992, whichever first occurred. (DOD 5, index 99) 
The court made the alimony permanent and based it upon the 
plaintiff's current income and the fact that the defendant is not 
currently employed and is without income and given the debts and 
expenses of the parties, most of which must be paid by the 
plaintiff, and given the needs of the plaintiff and defendant, 
reasonable alimony was One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars 
($1,400.00) per month. (FOF 9, index 89) 
"An alimony award should . . . to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain 
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner v. Gardner. 78 P.2d 1076, 
1081 (Utah 1988). 
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the Supreme 
Court of Utah established the basic purpose of alimony and 
delineated the three factors which must be considered in making 
an alimony award. The Utah Supreme Court held that "the purpose 
of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict 
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punitive damages on the husband." Id. at 411, quoting 2 Nelson 
Divorce and Annulment (2d Ed. 1961 Rev. Vol.), Section 14.06 
pp. 11-12. This support was to be sufficient to enable the wife 
to enjoy the same standard of living as she enjoyed before the 
divorce. English, supra, at 411. The court then explained that 
"criteria considered in determining a reasonable award for 
support and maintenance include the financial conditions and 
needs of the wife; the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the husband to 
provide support. English, supra, at 411-412. 
The three factors enunciated in English are now mandatory 
and must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Further, the 
trial court must enter findings as to each factor. See, Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). "The trial court must make 
sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a 
reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based upon these three factors." 
Id. at 492. 
In determining an alimony award, trial courts should attempt 
to leave the parties with nearly equal standards of living. 
Gardner, supra, at 1081. In Gardner the husband was a surgeon 
earning Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) per month at the time of 
the parties' divorce. The wife was unemployed. All assets of 
the parties were equally divided between the two. There were no 
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significant liabilities. The court awarded One Thousand Two 
Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) per month to the wife as alimony, to 
be reduced to Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month when she 
became qualified to receive social security. In overturning the 
alimony award as an abuse of discretion, the Court expressly 
stated that the wife was entitled to a standard of living as 
close as possible to the standard of living she enjoyed while 
married. Gardner, supra, at 1081. See, also, Howell v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). "It follows that if the payor 
spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to 
provide for only basic needs, but should also consider the 
recipient spouse's 'station in life.'" Howell, supra, at 1212, 
quoting Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1988). In 
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
disagreed with the husband's argument that the court abused its 
discretion in awarding alimony where the husband was left with 
ample resources, "to provide himself with what is very likely to 
be a far more luxurious standard of living than his wife will 
enjoy." Id. at 649. 
As indicated at the time of trial, the plaintiff's annual 
gross income, including car allowance and anticipated bonuses, 
was One Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars 
($150,120.00), which is an average gross monthly income of Twelve 
Thousand Five Hundred Ten Dollars ($12,510.00). The court found 
that the plaintiff had been the primary wage-earner during the 
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marriage and that the parties' income from the previous years, 
including bonuses and relocation reimbursements were as follows: 
1990 - $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 - $111,715; 1987-
$92,674; 1986 - $76,149. (FOF 6, index 87-88) 
The court also found that the defendant's monthly expenses, 
including the expenses attendant to herself, the two children and 
the two grandchildren residing in her home, were Five Thousand 
One Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00). The court awarded 
the plaintiff both of the vehicles he requested and ordered him 
to pay all of the debts. (DOD 14, 15, index 103, 104) As shown 
on "Plaintiff's Exhibit 2," the payment on plaintiff's GMC 
vehicle is Four* Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars ($452.00) per month and 
the payment on plaintiff's Bronco is Two Hundred Sixty-Four 
Dollars ($264.00) per month, for total car payments by plaintiff 
each month of Seven Hundred Sixteen Dollars ($716.00). That is 
an annual expense to plaintiff of Eight Thousand Five Hundred 
Ninety-Two Dollars ($8,592.00). He also has a monthly payment to 
Olivette Furniture at the rate of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) 
and a balance owing of approximately Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00), which will be paid off in approximately ten months. 
Plaintiff also has two K-Plus loans set forth which he was 
ordered to pay. Loan number one is to be paid at the rate of One 
Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($135.00) per month and the balance 
owing at the time of trial was One Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty-
Two Dollars ($1,762.00). The loan would then be paid in full in 
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approximately one year. Loan number two is to be paid at the 
rate of Fifty-Seven Dollars ($57.00) per month, and the balance 
owing at the time of trial was approximately Nine Hundred Twenty-
Six Dollars ($926.00), which loan should be paid off within two 
years. There was also listed a debt to Dr. Hicks of Five Hundred 
Sixty Dollars ($560.00), payable Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) per 
month. Obviously, that debt could be paid in full and 
extinguished immediately with plaintiff's income level. In 
addition, there is a debt to Pacific Power having a principal 
balance of Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($6,700.00), 
payable at the rate of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month. 
At that rate, that loan should be paid in full within 
approximately two years. The only other debt and obligation 
listed as a marital debt and found by the court to be a marital 
debt was the debt identified as "loan payable to Mr. and Mrs. 
Paul Baker." (DOD 15, index 104) As more thoroughly discussed 
in Point V below, few payments have been made on that loan. See 
"Defendant's Exhibit 3" received by the court (TR, p.35, 11.22-
24) which is appended hereto, designated as "Appendix E." That 
principal debt is listed at Ninety-Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Eighty-Nine Dollars ($94,389.00). The monies were borrowed 
commencing in 1984 and payments made by plaintiff to his parents 
since that time have totalled Three Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-
Five Dollars ($3,925.00). (TR, p.35, 11.17-24) In addition, 
there is no promissory note or other contract evidencing that 
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debt and no interest is being paid. (TR, p.42, 1.17 to p.43, 
1.6) Even if this Court upholds the trial court's finding that 
this is a legitimate debt and, therefore, should be considered in 
the allocation of the marital assets and monies, the Court must 
also note the minimal payments that have been made in infrequent 
and small amounts since 1984 in assessing the amount of money 
available to the plaintiff to pay alimony to defendant. On 
"Plaintiff's Exhibit 2" he has allocated Twelve Thousand Dollars 
($12,000.00) per year as payment on that non-interest-bearing 
debt. At no time in the history of the debt has plaintiff made 
any such payments, and there is no requirement within the Decree 
or Findings that any particular payments be made on that debt. 
The nature of that debt must be considered in the award of 
alimony. Again, however, regardless of the legitimacy of that 
debt, if the court allocates One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per 
month from plaintiff's gross income and allocates a monthly 
amount for the other marital debts, excluding his car payments, 
those monthly totals would be as follows: Olivette Furniture-
$200.00; K-Plus Loan 1 - $135.00; K-Plus Loan 2 - $57.00; Dr. 
Hicks - $25.00; Pacific Power - $400.00; loan payable to Mr. and 
Mrs. Paul Baker - $1,000. The total is One Thousand Eight 
Hundred Seventeen Dollars ($1,817.00). If the court reduces 
plaintiff's gross monthly income of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred 
Ten Dollars ($12,510.00) by that monthly debt load, his monthly 
gross income is then Ten Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Three 
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Dollars ($10,693.00). 
Other than one-half of the household furnishings and one-
half of the retirement funds, the only asset awarded to defendant 
was her 1990 Ford Bronco, which has a debt of Fourteen Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00) and has an assessed value of 
Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00). (FOF 13, index 90) 
Defendant's monthly car payment is Three Hundred Ninety-Six 
Dollars ($396.00). Excluding, therefore, those car payments as 
being debts now personal to the individuals receiving the asset, 
defendant's monthly income is zero, without child support or 
alimony, and plaintiff's gross monthly income is Ten Thousand Six 
Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars ($10,693.00). After payment of the 
child support ordered by the trial court, defendant will then 
have monthly income of One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($1,600.00) and plaintiff will have a gross monthly income of 
Nine Thousand Ninety-Three Dollars ($9,093.00). If the plaintiff 
pays monthly alimony of One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars 
($1,400.00), and if the wife dedicates all of the child support 
award of One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month 
to the children, she will then be left with One Thousand Four 
Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00), gross, per month to cover her 
expenses and plaintiff will then have Seven Thousand Six Hundred 
Sixty-Three Dollars ($7,663.00), gross, per month to cover his 
expenses. Again, that is assuming that plaintiff is actually 
going to take One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per month out of 
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his gross income and pay it to his parents • Even if the 
defendant becomes as a public school teacher at an annual income 
of, say, Twenty-Four Thousand Dollars ($24,000.00), she will then 
have Three Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($3,400.00) gross income 
per month and plaintiff will still have Seven Thousand Six 
Hundred Sixty-Three Dollars ($7,663.00) per month after paying 
his mother and father One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per month. 
In addition, the defendant will pay all of the current marital 
debts, again excluding the vehicle debts and excluding the debt 
payable to his parents, within two years. He would then have an 
additional Eight Hundred Seventeen Dollars ($817.00) available 
per month for his monthly needs and expenses. 
It is impossible, given the foregoing facts, which were 
known to the trial court at the time of trial and which are set 
forth in the findings, to in any way equalize the parties' 
standards of living with the alimony award. The award will 
permit the plaintiff to continue with his luxurious "station in 
life" and will allow him to continue an expensive lifestyle, 
including race horses (TR, p.77, 1.11 to p.78., 1.16), while the 
defendant will be entitled to only a modest standard of living. 
The parties have enjoyed a comfortable standard of living for the 
last several years. (TR, p.70, 1.21 to p.71, 1.21; FOF 6, index 
89) The parties were married 22 years and the evidence presented 
to the court was that the defendant did not further her career in 
order to continue moving and to further the plaintiff's career. 
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(TR, p.27f 1.21 to p.28, 1.9; TR, p. 85, 1.20 to p. 86, 1.14) 
Defendant testified, and plaintiff admitted, that defendant had 
to change employment each time the plaintiff's work required a 
move. Defendant requested an award of alimony at the rate of Two 
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per month. (TR, p.85, 11.18-20) 
The court awarded the alimony offered by plaintiff in his 
testimony and exhibits of One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars 
($1,400.00) per month. Given the facts and circumstances, the 
previous standard of living, the plaintiff's ability to earn 
income, the defendant's ability to earn income and her needs, and 
given the length of the marriage and what the defendant has given 
up to assist the plaintiff in pursuing his career, the inequity 
of the alimony award herein needs little explanation. 
In reaching its decision, the trial court failed to enter 
adequate findings as to the plaintiff's ability to pay alimony. 
In making the award the court stressed that the plaintiff emerged 
from the divorce carrying a significant debt burden. (FOF 13,14, 
index 90,91) As explained above, after payment of that debt 
burden, the plaintiff emerges with a gross monthly income of over 
Six Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars ($6,660.00), while the 
defendant is left with an alimony award of One Thousand Four 
Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00). For this reason, the court abused 
its discretion and the alimony award should be reversed and the 
court should enter an alimony based upon the facts and 
circumstances outlined in English v. English, supra. 
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B. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED ALL OF DEFENDANT'S 
EXPENSES, INCLUDING THOSE ATTENDANT TO THE 
GRANDCHILDREN AND THE HOME. 
The trial court found that the expenses related to the two 
grandchildren in the home of the defendant were not relevant to, 
nor should they be considered in, the court's award of alimony 
and child support. (FOF 8, index 88) At the time of trial, the 
plaintiff testified that the parties' granddaughter, Lacey, had 
been living with the parties for approximately five years, since 
she was a few months of age. (TR, p.43, 11.16-25) The plaintiff 
testified that the child called plaintiff both grandpa and daddy. 
(TR, p. 44, 11.6-7) At the time of trial, the plaintiff 
acknowledged that the parties' grandson, Christopher, also lived 
with the defendant and the parties' children. (TR, p.46, 11.7-9) 
The defendcint testified that she lived in the marital residence 
with the two children and with the two grandchildren Christopher 
and Lacey and that Lacey had resided with her and her husband 
since the child's third month of life. (TR, p.61, 11.20-22, 
p. 62, 11.7-11) The grandson, Christopher, has resided with her 
since January 1991. (TR, p.62, 11.1,2) Plaintiff's counsel 
objected to any testimony regarding the grandchildren on the 
basis of irrelevancy and immateriality and the court sustained 
that objection. Defendant's counsel proffered that if defendant 
would have been permitted to testify she would have testified 
that plaintiff encouraged defendant to take both grandchildren 
into the home and encouraged the defendant to stay home and not 
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work and to take care of the children in her home. She also 
would have testified that their grandchild, Lacey, knows the 
parties as her mother and father, rather than as her 
grandparents. Further, defendant would have testified that the 
grandchildren will continue in her home and that she will incur 
additional expense due to the fact that those children are in her 
home. (TR, pp.89, 1.19 to p. 90, 1.9) There is no case law in 
the State of Utah which is on point to this issue. The defendant 
does not contend that the plaintiff owes a duty of child support 
for the grandchildren in defendant's home. Defendant contends, 
however, that the plaintiff's request and encouragement that the 
children live with the parties and requirement that the defendant 
stay home and care for these minor grandchildren, and the fact 
that she then incurred significant expenses attendant to the care 
of those two children is pertinent to the issue of alimony. It 
is defendant's position and belief that the court erred in not 
permitting the testimony relating to the expenses attendant to 
the grandchildren as those expenses are one of three factors to 
be considered pursuant to Jones v. Jones, supra. Not only are 
the expenses appropriately considered because they are real 
expenses that are currently being incurred, but also because the 
reason for their incurrence was the instigation and encouragement 
of the plaintiff, who has now left the marital residence and 
washed his hands of the situation. Since the trial court failed 
to consider those expenses and needs, the issue should be 
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remanded for determination of the needs and the appropriate level 
of alimony based upon those needs. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE. 
The trial court awarded the defendant one-half of the 
furnishings and fixtures at the marital residence. The trial 
court also awarded the defendant the 1990 Ford Bronco that had 
been operated by her during the marriage. The court assessed the 
value of that Bronco at Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00) 
and acknowledged a debt on the same of Fourteen Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00) . The court assigned a value of 
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) to each party's one-half of 
the furnishings and fixtures. (FOF 13, index 90) There was no 
testimony at the time of trial regarding any of the furnishings 
or any of them having any particular value. There was no 
testimony regarding any particular painting, piece of jewelry, 
fur, couch or any like object. The Fifteen Thousand Dollar 
($15,000.00) for each party's one-half of the furnishings and 
fixtures was taken from the proposal and exhibit of the plaintiff 
received by the court, "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1," and was accepted 
by the court as a finding. (TR, p. 17, 11.1-7) A copy of that 
exhibit is attached hereto as "Appendix F." Deducting the debt 
on the Bronco from the value assessed, defendant was left with a 
net estate of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00). The 
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trial court awarded the plaintiff the residence at 11718 South 
Eureka Way with a net equity of Forty Thousand Dollars 
($40,000.00), the two and three-quarter acres of land in Price, 
Utah, which was unencumbered and assigned a value of Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000.00), the 1991 GMC vehicle, the 1989 Bronco 
vehicle, a two-year old filly assessed at a value of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) and a horse by the name of D. B. Cooper, 
assessed at a value of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($1,500.00). The trial court also awarded the plaintiff all 
garden, power and hand tools, the tack for the horses and U. S. 
Savings Bonds valued at Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00). The court 
acknowledged and accepted the plaintiff's testimony regarding the 
values of each of the items even though the plaintiff never 
offered the basis for his valuations set forth on his Exhibit 1. 
The only explanation of the document and the basis for the 
valuation was articulated by plaintiff's counsel and a proffer 
accepted by the court indicating that "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1" and 
the statement of assets and liabilities was prepared under 
counsel's supervision and direction and that it contained all of 
the assets and liabilities of which plaintiff had any knowledge 
and contained a proposed division and his suggested division and 
that it would be his testimony if plaintiff were called to 
testify about the exhibit. (TR, p.16, 11.18-25) Defendant 
provided her own schedule of assets, which was designated as 
"Defendant's Exhibit 7" and which was received by the court. 
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(TR, p.83, 1.20 to p.84, 1.4) A copy of "Defendant's Exhibit 7" 
is attached hereto and designated as "Appendix G." The 
defendant's schedule of marital assets is incorrectly titled 
"Plaintiff's Proposed Property Division," but that exhibit is 
truly defendant's proposed property division. The values of the 
vehicles and the debts vary from those given by plaintiff. In 
addition, the defendant's schedule does not include the debt set 
forth on "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1" as "loan payable to plaintiff's 
parents." All other items, assets and debts are listed. With no 
findings or explanation, the court adopted the division of assets 
and liabilities set forth on "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1," except for 
an item listed as a liability to defendant's parents on page two 
of that exhibit. (TR, p.117, 11.11-17) That exhibit was adopted 
as a finding of the court. (FOF 13, index 90) Again, there were 
no findings by the court as to why the court adopted the 
valuations of the plaintiff as opposed to the valuations of the 
defendant on the values of the vehicle, the debts then owing or 
the values of the U. S. Savings Bonds, and the court erred in not 
providing adequate findings as to that division of marital 
property and the values thereof and the exact debts owing 
thereon. 
In addition, the court in its findings allocated the debt 
entitled "loan payable to plaintiff's parents" to the plaintiff 
and specifically stated: 
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The obligation set forth in subparagraph 14(r) of 
paragraph 14 [sic] above, which is a loan repayable to 
the plaintiff's parents in the amount of $94,389.00 
(which does not include any interest), is a marital 
debt of the parties which must be considered in the 
division of the marital estate and which accordingly 
reduces the marital net worth of the parties to a 
negative net worth. The debt was incurred from time to 
time commencing in 1984 and some payments have been 
made thereon as evidence by Defendant's Exhibit 3. 
Since plaintiff is charged with the responsibility for 
repayment of that debt to plaintiff's parents, the 
division of the marital net worth, as provided for in 
Paragraph 14 above, leaves the plaintiff with a 
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets 
being awarded to the defendant have a positive net 
worth of $17,500.00. The Court finds this imbalance to 
be necessary and equitable because the plaintiff is the 
only party who has earnings with which the liabilities 
of the parties, as set forth in Paragraph 14 [sic] 
above, can be paid. (FOF 14, index 91,92) 
At the trial, plaintiff testified that "Defendant's Exhibit 
3" was an accurate representation of payments made on the alleged 
loan from plaintiff's parents. (TR, p.35, 11.12-16) That 
exhibit shows payments made in the sum of Three Thousand Nine 
Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($3,925.00). The exhibit shows 
eleven payments having been made in 1984, two payments in 1985, 
two payments in 1987, two payments in 1988, and one payment in 
1991. While plaintiff testified that defendant knew about the 
monies being borrowed from his parents (TR, p.36, 11.4-10), the 
defendant vehemently denied any knowledge of those loans or any 
debt owing to plaintiff's parents until the divorce action was 
filed. (TR, p.72, 1.24 to p. 73, 1.13; p.75, 11.7-13; p.76, 1.21 
to p.77, 1.10) 
The plaintiff testified that he earned more in succeeding 
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years than he did in 1984. (TR, p.38, 11.10-25) While the 
plaintiff earned One Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred 
Forty-Eight Dollars ($169,248.00) in 1990 (FOF 6, index 88), he 
made no payments in 1990. Being questioned as to why no payments 
were made, the plaintiff stated, "I had extreme debt. No money." 
(TR, p.38, 11.19-21) While plaintiff admitted that his current 
gross income per annum is One Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred 
Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00) and the court found the same (FOF 2, 
index 87), the plaintiff made only one payment in December of 
1991, six months after the complaint for divorce was filed. (TR, 
p.38, 11.22-25) Although plaintiff received a Twelve Thousand 
Dollar ($12,000.00) bonus in 1991, none of that money was paid to 
his parents. (TR, p.39, 11.6-10) Although plaintiff received a 
relocation payment in 1990 of approximately Twenty-Four Thousand 
Dollars ($24,000.00), no payments were made to his parents. (TR, 
p.39, 11.11-21) In 1988, when the parties earned One Hundred 
Eleven Thousand Seven Hundred Fifteen Dollars ($111,715.00) (FOF 
6, index 88), the plaintiff paid his parents Six Hundred Dollars 
($600.00) (Defendant's Exhibit 3). In 1987, when the parties 
earned Ninety-Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars (FOF 
6, index 88), the plaintiff paid his parents Seven Hundred 
Dollars ($700.00) (Defendant's Exhibit 3). In 1986, when the 
parties earned Seventy-Six Thousand One Hundred Forty-Nine 
Dollars ($76,149.00) (FOF 6, index 88), no payments were made to 
plaintiff's parents. (Defendant's Exhibit 3) There exists no 
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promissory note or written contract evidencing this loan. There 
is no interest accruing on the alleged loan. (TR, p.42, 1.20 to 
p.43, 1.1) 
While plaintiff testified that he and defendant owe Ninety-
Four Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Nine Dollars ($94,389.00) to 
plaintiff's mother and father (TR, p.21, 11.2-8), all the 
evidence indicates that there are no arrangements for payment, 
there is no enforceable note, that few payments have been made, 
and little or no payments were made in those years when the 
plaintiff and defendant had the most resources to pay and large 
lump sums of money from which to pay. The trial court awarded 
that debt to the plaintiff and, ostensibly, in return awarded him 
all of the real property of the parties and the majority of the 
personal property of the parties. This included acreage in 
Price, Utah, the down payment for the acquisition of which came 
from defendant's family. (TR, p.98, 11.13-22) 
The trial court did not order the plaintiff to use the 
proceeds from the sale of the marital residence to pay his 
parents. The trial court did not order the plaintiff to sell the 
parties' assets, including the race horses awarded to plaintiff, 
to pay the debt to his parents. In fact, the court makes no 
order relating to the maintenance of that debt. The end result 
of the order of the court is that plaintiff is receiving almost 
all of the marital assets and will likely not pay the debt he 
alleges he owes to his parents. Again, the facts simply do not 
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support his allegations that he will suddenly start making 
payments to his father at the rate of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) per month. The only payment that he made since March 
of 1988 was one payment in December of 1991 after the instant 
litigation was commenced. While the division of the marital 
property and "perforce of marital debts is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed by 
this court absent a clear abuse of discretion," Sinclair v. 
Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396, 398, (Utah 1987), citing Aravle v. 
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (1984). "The law contemplates a fair and 
equitable, not an equal, division of the marital debts." Id. at 
398. 
The ireality of many marriages is that parents provide 
support and funds for their children. It is not uncommon for 
"debts owed to parents" to come to the fore when a divorce is 
filed. At the time of pre-trial on this matter before the 
Honorable Domestic Relations Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., 
the Commissioner noted in his minute entry that "the 
commissioner's experience is that many of these debts were not 
intended to be paid back when the money was provided by parents 
and that, absent evidence to the contrary, each party should be 
ordered to assume and pay the debt owing to his or her family." 
(Minute Entry dated 2/10/92, paragraph 4, index 73) This Court 
may find the alleged debt to be a debt as the trial court did, 
but the court, as a court of equity, must do justice to the 
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defendant and to the marital estate. The trial court has not 
done equity. The trial court has awarded the marital estate to 
the plaintiff and has left the defendant without substantial 
assets. After 22 years of marriage, plaintiff can continue 
living comfortably with virtually all of the marital assets, and 
defendant is left without a job, without sufficient support and 
with no assets or home to live in and no funds of money with 
which to purchase a home. The trial court has indeed abused its 
discretion and done injustice in this case. The division of the 
marital estate should be set aside and the defendant's proposed 
property division as set forth in Exhibit 7 should be adopted by 
the court as being a fair and equitable division of the marital 
assets and debt. 
POINT VI: DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS. 
Based upon the foregoing and based upon plaintiff's income 
and defendant's lack of income and her needs, the defendant 
respectfully moves the above-entitled court for an award of 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should award 
possession of the marital residence to the defendant pending the 
children attaining their majority. If the Court does not award 
possession of the marital residence to defendant, this Court 
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should re-allocate the mortgage obligation owing thereon pending 
sale of the* same. Further, this matter should be remanded to the 
trial court to take evidence and to make adequate findings as to 
the issues of child support and alimony and this Court should 
make an equitable division of the marital estate or remand the 
matter to the trial court to make an equitable division of the 
marital estate with the direction and assistance of this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 10th day of August, 1992. 
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I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAN BAKER, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
P l a i n t i f f , ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 914902633DA 
LUJUANA BAKER, ) 
) Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. ) 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective 
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on 
Thursday, March 2 6, 19 92. The parties were sworn and testified. 
Exhibits were received. The parties entered into a stipulation 
on the record. Based on the foregoing and based upon the 
matters on file herein, the Court now makes and enters its 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are both actual and 
bonafide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and were 
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for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each 
other on June 8, 1970. 
3. There are irreconcilable differences between the 
parties making a continuation of the marital relationship 
impossible. 
4. Three (3) children have been born as issue of 
this marriage. One (1) of the children is beyond her eighteenth 
(18th) birthday. Two (2) of the children are minors and reside 
with the Defendant. Their names, birthdays and ages are as 
follows: 
Camille Ann born Jan. 5, 1983, 9 years of age 
Dannie born December 6, 1983, 8 years of age 
5. The Defendant i s a good mother and the care, 
custody and control of the two (2) minor chi ldren should be 
awarded to the Defendant, reserving to the P la in t i f f the r ight 
to v i s i t with said ch i ld ren a t a l l reasonable times and places. 
6. The P l a i n t i f f i s employed and his current annual 
gross compensation, inc luding car allowance and an t i c ipa t ed 
bonuses, i s $150, 120. 00. The P l a in t i f f has been the primary 
wage earner during the marriage. The p a r t i e s ' incomes for the 
previous years, inc lud ing bonuses and r e loca t i on reimbursement, 
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are as follows: 1990 - $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 -
$111,715; 1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149. 
7. The Defendant is an educated, trained and 
qualified teacher in the Utah public school system and she is in 
good health. She last worked and last taught a full contract 
year for the school year 1989-1990. She has worked during the 
majority of the parties' marriage as a school teacher or 
secretary. She is currently uncertified, but can recertify upon 
completion of three (3) academic hours of training which she can 
readily obtain between now and the beginning of the 1992-1993 
school year. The Defendant is currently unemployed and 
presently has no income. 
8. The Defendant testified that her monthly expenses 
are $4,800.00 per month, excluding her car payment which is 
$396.00, for a total of $5,196.00 per month. The Defendant 
testified that those expenses include the expenses attendant to 
herself, her two children, and the two grandchildren residing in 
her home. The expenses related to the two grandchildren are not 
relevant to, nor should they be considered in, the Court' s award 
of alimony and child support. 
9. Premised and predicated upon the total gross 
compensation of the Plaintiff (including bonuses and car 
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allowance) of $150,120.00 and further premised and predicated 
upon the fact that the Defendant is currently unemployed and 
currently has no income, reasonable child support to be paid by 
Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of the two (2) children 
is $1, 600.00 per month. The income level of the Plaintiff 
exceeds the guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be a reasonable sum. 
Given the Plaintiff s current income and the fact that the 
Defendant is not currently employed and is without income and 
given the debts and expenses of the parties, most of which must 
be paid by the Plaintiff and given the needs of the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant, reasonable alimony to be paid by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant is $1, 400. 00 per month. 
10. The Plaintiff has available to him through his 
place of employment, health and accident insurance coverage for 
the benefit of the minor children. 
11. The 1991 federal and state income tax returns 
have not been filed but it is to the benefit of the parties that 
they cooperate and file joint returns for calendar year 1991. 
12. The Plaintiff has, or can obtain, insurance upon 
his life with unencumbered death benefits in the amount of 
$150,000.00 and it is in the interest of the children that he do 
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so for purposes of providing support for the children in the 
event of Plaintiff s untimely death. 
13. The assets and (liabilities) of the parties 
accumulated and incurred during the marriage and currently 
outstanding and an equitable division thereof is as follows: 
No. Description Mrs, Baker Mr. Baker 
(a) Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way $183,000.00 
(b) Mortgage on residence (143,000.00) 
(c) Household furnishings and 
f i x t u r e s a t r e s i d e n c e $15,000.00 15,000.00 
(d) 2 3/4 acres i n P r i c e , Utah 6,000.00 
(e) 1990 Ford Bronco opera ted 
by Mrs. Baker 17,000.00 
(f) Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00) 
(g) 1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker 18,000.00 
(h) Purchase debt on 1991 GMC . (19,000.00) 
(i) 1989 Ford Bronco 12,000.00 
(j) Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco (10,800.00) 
(k) Horse - 2 year filly 2,000.00 
(1) Horse - D. B. Cooper 1,500.00 
(m) Garden, power & hand tools 2,000.00 
(n) Tack for horses 400.00 
(o) U.S. Savings Bonds 600.00 
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(p) K - p l u s l o a n no. 1 owing t o 
P a c i f i c Power ( 1 , 7 6 2 . 0 0 ) 
(q) K-plus loan no. 2 - --..ng to 
Pacific Power (926.00) 
(r) Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents (94,389.00) 
(s) Loan payable to Pacific Power (6,700.00) 
(t) Payable to Dr. Hicks (560.00) 
(u) Payable to Olivette Furniture (2,000.00) 
(v) Estimated attorney' s fees for 
Mr. Baker (2,500.00) 
(w) Estimated attorney' s fees for 
Mrs. Baker (2,500.00) 
(x) Clothing and personal effects 
each party - not valued - NV NV 
NET VALUES 617, 500. 00 Sf 43. 637. 00) 
(y) Together with an equal division between the parties of 
all 40IK, pension and retirement funds of both parties 
per appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations and other 
necessary orders. 
14. The obligation set forth in subparagraph (r) of 
paragraph 14 above, which is a loan repayable to the Plaintiff s 
parents in the amount of $94, 389. 00 (which does not include any 
interest), is a marital debt of the parties which must be 
considered in the division of the marital estate and which 
accordingly reduces the marital net worth of the parties to a 
negative net worth. The debt was incurred from time to time 
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commencing in 1984 and some payments have been made thereon as 
evidenced by Defendant' s Exhibit 3. Since Plaintiff is charged 
with the responsibility for repayment of that debt to 
Plaintiff's parents, the division of the marital net worth, as 
provided for in paragraph 14 above, leaves the Plaintiff with a 
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets being awarded 
to the Defendant have a positive net worth of $17,500.00. The 
Court finds this imbalance to be necessary and equitable because 
the Plaintiff is the only party who has earnings with which the 
liabilities of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 14 above, 
can be paid. 
15. While there was some evidence that Defendant' s 
parents have, during the course of the marriage, provided some 
support to the Plaintiff and Defendant, there was no evidence 
that it was other than a gift and there was no evidence that 
Defendant' s parents expected the repayment thereof. 
16. At the time of trial, the Plaintiff had in his 
bank account the approximate sum of $12,000.00 resulting from 
receipt by him of a recent bonus. The $12,000.00 is not 
scheduled as a separate asset because it is part of and included 
in Plaintiff s income stream of $150, 120.00. 
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17. Because of the substantial debt of the parties 
and the resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford 
to maintain and make the mortgage payments on the residence at 
11718 S. Eureka Way and the same must be sold at the earliest 
possible time. The parties stipulated that the marital 
residence has a value of $183, 000. 00. Pending sale, it is 
reasonable that the Defendant be permitted temporary possession 
of said real property. The monthly mortgage obligation is 
approximately $1,665.00. Pending sale, it is reasonable that 
the Defendant pay $1,000.00 of that monthly mortgage obligation 
and the Plaintiff pay the balance of the mortgage until October 
1, at which time, if the home is not yet sold, the Defendant 
should pay the entire mortgage obligation. During the period 
that the Plaintiff is contributing to the mortgage obligation, 
it is reasonable that the alimony be reduced to the rate of 
$1,200.00 per month. 
18. The parties stipulated (and the Court finds the 
stipulation reasonable) to the effect that Plaintiff would pay 
to the Defendant, for the use and benefit of her attorneys, an 
additional sum of $2,500.00 which is in addition to the previous 
attorney' s fees paid by the Plaintiff for the benefit and use of 
the Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. 
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19. The parties stipulated that commencing with 
calendar year 1992 and thereafter and for so long as Plaintiff 
has completely paid and discharged his obligation for child 
support, Plaintiff would be entitled to take and claim the minor 
child, Dannie, as a dependent exemption deduction upon 
Plaintiff s federal and state income tax returns and that 
Defendant would be entitled to take and claim the minor child, 
Camille Ann, as a dependent exemption deduction upon her federal 
and state income tax returns. j 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court now makes I 
and enters its j 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ! 
i 
20. The parties are each entitled and should each be i 
granted a Judgment and Decree divorcing each party from the 
other. 
21. The Defendant should be granted the care, custody j 
and control of the two (2) minor children who are issue of the 
marriage. There should be reserved to the Plaintiff, liberal 
and generous visitation rights. 
22. The Court should make and enter its Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce and Order, consistent with and including and 
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embracing the matters that are set forth and implicit within the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and resulting equitably therefrom. 
DATED this [to day o f ^ S S , 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS-'TO. 
Davxd S. Young^ Judo^A 
-y/MijL 
Williams 
Y for Defendant 
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I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAN BAKER, 
STATE OF UTAH Q \ r 7 ^ T 7 0 T 7 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
LUJUANA BAKER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 914902633DA 
Judge David S. Young 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective 
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on 
Thursday, March 26, 1992. The parties were sworn and testified. 
Exhibits were received. The parties entered into a stipulation 
on the record. The Court has heretofore made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based upon the matters 
on file herein, the testimony of the parties, the Exhibits 
received into evidence, the stipulation of the parties and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered in 
&C-*>llm Ofl *C\\ u 
this matter and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and 
enters this Judgment and Decree of Divorce: 
1. The parties are each given and granted a Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony and 
divorcing each from the other. This divorce shall be final upon 
entry of this Judgment. 
2. There is awarded to the Defendant the care, 
custody and control of the two minor children who are issue of 
the marriage, to wit: 
Camille Ann born Jan. 4, 1983, 9 years of age 
Dannie born December 5, 1983, 8 years of age 
There is reserved to the Plaintiff liberal and 
generous rights of visitation, including the right to visit with 
the children at all reasonable times and places and not less 
than the amount established in the visitation policy adopted by 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The Defendant shall keep the Plaintiff informed 
as to the health, education, welfare and social and religious 
development of the children and the Plaintiff shall have open 
and free access to the health, education and religious records 
of the children. The Defendant shall consult with and advise 
the Plaintiff about major decisions that affect the children. 
Without diminishing Defendant' s authority and responsibility as 
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the custodial parent, she shall listen to and consider 
recommendations and suggestions of the Plaintiff with respect to 
the children. Neither party shall, by word or conduct, 
denigrate the other to or in the presence of the children and 
each party shall encourage an open, free and loving relationship 
between the children and the other party. 
3. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as child 
support, for the use and benefit of the two (2) minor children, 
the sum of $1, 600. 00 per month, commencing with the month of 
April 1992. Eight hundred dollars ($800.00) thereof shall be 
payable on or before the 5th day of each month and the other 
$800.00 shall be payable on or before the 20th day of each 
month. In addition to the child support herein provided for, 
the Plaintiff shall, for so long as he has a duty to pay child 
support, maintain insurance upon his life with unencumbered 
death benefits in the amount of $150,000.00 payable at the 
option of the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the children, their 
guardian or a corporate trustee for the use and benefit of the 
children. 
4. The Plaintiff shall maintain health and accident 
insurance for the use and benefit of the children. The 
Defendant shall pay all uninsured, routine medical and dental 
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expenses, including rout ine office v i s i t s , examinations and 
immunizations. The p a r t i e s sha l l each pay one-half (1/2) of a l l 
other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and denra l 
expenses. The P l a i n t i f f sha l l be e n t i t l e d to take a c r e d i t 
against his child support obl igat ion in an amount equal to the 
cost incurred by him i n maintaining the hea l th and acc ident 
insurance for the benef i t of the children. The P l a i n t i f f shal l 
provide the Defendanr with wri t ten v e r i f i c a t i o n by his employer 
e s t ab l i sh ing the cost incurred by the P l a i n t i f f for maintaining 
heal th and accident insurance for the ch i ldren only. 
5. Commencing with the month of April 1992, the 
P l a i n t i f f shall pay t o the Defendant, as alimony, the sum of 
$1,200.00 per month. Commencing with the month a f te r t h e month 
in which the r e s i d e n t i a l property referred to in paragraph 9 
below i s sold or with the month of October 19 92 (whichever 
occurs f i r s t ) , the alimony herein provided for shal l be 
increased to the sum of $1,400.00 per month. One-half (1/2) of 
the alimony shall be payable on or before the 5th day of each 
month and one-half (1/2) sha l l be payable on or before the 20th 
day of each month. The alimony herein provided for s h a l l 
terminate upon the f i r s t of the following events: 
a. The death of e i the r pa r ty ; 
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b. The remarriage of the Defendant; 
c. Cohabitation by the Defendant under 
circumstances tha t would cause alimony to be terminated in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
6. The alimony and child support herein provided for 
i s premised and predicated upon currenr t o t a l gross compensation 
of the P l a in t i f f ( including bonuses and car allowance) of 
$150, 120. 00 per year and is further premised and predicated on 
the fact thai: while the Defendant i s a t ra ined , educated, 
qua l i f ied and c e r t i f i e d school teacher, she i s current ly 
unemployed and p resen t ly has no income. 
7. For each calendar year (commencing with calendar 
year 1992 and the rea f t e r ) tha t the P l a i n t i f f has completely paid 
and discharged his ob l iga t ion for child support, P l a i n t i f f shall 
be e n t i t l e d to take and claim the minor chi ld , Dannie, as a 
dependent exemption deduction upon Plaint i ff7 s federal and s t a te 
income t ax returns. 
8. The p a r t i e s sha l l cooperate with each*' o ther and 
the Defendant shal l furnish information t o the P l a in t i f f 
necessary to complete the 1991 federal and s t a t e income tax 
re turns . I f there i s a net refund of both the federal and s ta te 
income taxes , then f i f t y percent (50%) of the net refund shal l 
- 5 -
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belong to the Plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) shall belong to 
the Defendant. If further federal and state taxes are due for 
calendar year 1991, the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge the 
same. 
9. The residence of the parties at 11718 South 
Eureka Way, South Jordan, Utah, is awarded to the Plaintiff, who 
shall immediately list the same for sale with a real estate 
broker. Pending the sale of the subject property, the Defendant 
and the minor children shall reside therein and shall care for 
and maintain the premises. Commencing with the month of April 
1992 and continuing through the month of September 1992, or 
until the property is sold (whichever occurs first), the 
Defendant shall pay upon the mortgage indebtedness on said 
property the sum of $1,000.00 per month and the Plaintiff shall, 
each month during said time period, pay the balance of the 
mortgage payment. If the property has not been sold by the end 
of September 1992, then thereafter and commencing with the month 
of October 1992, the Defendant shall make the full -monthly 
mortgage payment on said property until the same is sold. The 
award of the residential property is subject to the mortgage 
thereon which (except as otherwise provided herein), shall be 
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paid and discharged by the P la in t i f f who sha l l save and hold the 
Defendant harmless therefrom. 
10. The household furnishings, f ixtures , appliances 
and personal property located in the r e s i d e n t i a l proper ty may be 
used by the Defendant and minor children for so long as they 
res ide i n the property. At such time as the Defendant vacates 
the property, the p a r t i e s shal l divide the furnishings, 
f i x tu re s , appliances and personal property between them on an 
equal bas i s . 
11. By a separa te ly entered and appropriate Qualified 
Domestic Relation Order(s) , there shal l be divided equal ly 
between the pa r t i e s , a l l pension, p ro f i t sharing, re t i rement , 
IRA, t h r i f t plans, savings plans and other such benef i t s and 
plans i n which the p a r t i e s have an i n t e r e s t (s) and the value (s) 
thereof as of the date hereof. 
12. There i s awarded to the Defendant as her sole and 
separate property, her jewelry, clothing and personal ef fects , 
toge ther with the 1990 Ford Bronco operated by the Defendant. 
The award to the Defendant of the motor vehic le herein described 
i s subjec t to a debt thereon in the approximate amount of 
$14,500.00 payable t o P l a i n t i f f ' s c redi t union at the r a t e of 
$396. 00 per month. Commencing with the month of April 1992, the 
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Defendant shall promptly pay, when due, the monthly payments to 
the credit union until said indebtedness has been discharged. 
13. The Defendant shall pay and discharge all debrs 
and liabilities incurred by her since the separation of the 
parties in May, 1991, and not otheirwise provided for herein and 
she shall save and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
14. In addition to the family residence referred to 
in paragraph 9 above, the Plaintiff is awarded as his sole and 
separate property, the following specific assets: 
a. Approximately 2% acres of undeveloped land 
in Price, Utah; 
b. A 1991 GMC operated by the Plaintiff, 
subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of 
$19,000.00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge; 
c. A 1989 Ford Bronco operated by the Plaintiff 
subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of 
$10,800. 00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge; 
d. A horse identified as a 2 year old filly; 
e. A horse identified as D. B. Cooper; 
f. All of the tack and related equipment for 
the horses; 
g. The garden, power and hand tools; 
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h. U. S. Savings Bonds w i th a value of 
approximate ly $600.00; 
i . The P l a i n t i f f s c l o t h i n g , jewelry and 
pe r sona l e f f e c t s ; 
j . A bonus and promotion payment r e c e n t l y 
r ece ived by the P l a i n t i f f i n c i d e n t t o h i s 1991 employment i n the 
ne t sum of approximate ly $12,000.00; 
15. The P l a i n t i f f s h a l l pay and discharge t h e 
fo l lowing a d d i t i o n a l deb ts and o b l i g a t i o n s and s h a l l s ave and 
hold t h e Defendant harmless therefrom: 
a. K-plus loan no. 1 owing t o 
P a c i f i c Power (1 ,762.00) 
b. K-plus loan no. 2 owing t o 
P a c i f i c Power (926.00) 
c. Loan payable t o Mr. and Mrs. 
Paul Baker (94,389.00) 
d. Loan payable to Pacific Power (6,700.00) 
e. Payable to Dr. Hicks (560.00) 
f. Payable to Olivette Furniture (2,000.00) 
g. Plaintiff s attorney' s fees and 
costs incurred in this action 
h. Payable to Defendant' s attorney 
in this action to apply upon 
attorney' s fees and costs incurred 
by the Defendant in this action (2,500.00) 
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i . The P la in t i f f sha l l pay and 
discharge a l l debts and l i a b i l i t i e s 
incurred by him since the sepa-
r a t i o n of the pa r t i e " i n May, 
1991, and not otherwise provided 
for herein and he s h a l l save and 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
16. The p a r t i e s are ordered and directed to take such 
ac t ion and make and execute a l l such documents and do such 
things as are necessary to implement the provisions hereof. 
17. An O r d e r t o Wi thho ld and D e l i v e r Income s h a l l be 
e n t e r e d when, and i f , Defendan t becomes d e l i n q u e n t i n h i s 
suppor t : o b l i g a t i o n , and a p p r o p r i a t e income w i t h h o l d i n g 
p r o c e d u r e s s h a l l a p p l y t o e x i s t i n g and f u t u r e p a y o r s , a n d a l l 
w i t h h e l d income s h a l l be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e C o u r t , o r t o t h e 
O f f i c e o f Recovery S e r v i c e s u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s of §62A-11-401 
e t s e q . , Utah Code Ann. 
DATED t h i s / f c day of M&rcS 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
APPENDIX C 
PLAINTIFF'S EARNINGS AND PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED 
ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION THEREOF 
Annual 
Plaintiff's current gross annual income 
Includes car allowance of $7,800 and 
average bonus 
Less FICA withheld 
Withholding for health and accident insurance 
Withholding for accidental death 
Withholding for dental insurance 
Withholding for life insurance 
Withholding for vision insurance 
Car payment on GMC at $452.00 per month 
Car payment on Bronco at $264.00 per month 
Monthly payment to Olivette Furniture - $200.00 
Repayment of K-plus no. 1 loan @ $135.00 per month 
Repayment of K-plus no. 2 loan @ $57.00 per month 
Pay Dr. Hicks at $25.00 per month 
Payment to Paul Baker at $750.00 per month 
Pay Pacific Power at $400.00 per month 
Child support for two children at $1,600.00 
per month 
$150,120.00 
(5,115.00) 
(468.00) 
(210.00) 
(192.00) 
(821.00) 
(120.00) 
(5,424.00) 
(3,168.00) 
(2,400.00) 
(1,620.00) 
(684.00) 
(300.00) 
(12,000.00) 
(4,800.00) 
(19,284.00) 
Balance available for tax and support of the parties $ 93,514.00 
Suggested alimony for Mrs. Baker at $1,400.00 
per month (16,800.00) 
Federal and state taxes payable by Mr. Baker 
calculated as follows: 
Gross income 
Less alimony 
Less 2 personal exemptions 
and itemized deductions 
Taxable income 
$150,120.00 
(16,800.00) 
(5,000.00) 
$128,320.00 
Federal and state tax at 
combined estimated rate 
Federal & state income tax 
Net cash available for Mr. Baker 
x.33 
Monthly 
($42,345.00) 
($34,009.00) 
$ 2,834.00 
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PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT^ 
Month Annual 
Net cash for Mrs. Baker and children 
Child support $1,600.00 $19,284.00 
Alimony 1,400.00 16,800.00 
;3,00Q.00 $36,084.00 
With alimony and child support at this level and 
with Mrs. Baker filing as head of household and 
taking the children as exemptions, she will not 
incur Federal or State income tax liabilities. 
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APPENDIX D 
BAKER vs. BAKER 
Civil No. 9149Q2633DA 
DEFENDANT'S MONTHLY INCOME & EXPENSES 
GROSS INCOME 
Salary / Wages $ -0-
EXPENSES 
Rent/Mortgage: 
Real Property Taxes: 
Real Property Insurance: 
Maintenance: 
Food/Household supplies: 
Utilities including water, 
electricity, gas & heat: 
Telephone: 
Laundry/Cleaning: 
Clothing: 
Medical: 
Dental: 
Insurance: 
Child Care: 
Payment of child/spousal support 
re prior marriage: 
School: 
Entertainment: 
Incidentals: 
Transportation: 
Auto expenses: 
Auto payments: 
Installment payments: 
Other expenses: 
atty, fees 
cable 
newspaper 
therapist 
TOTAL EXPENSES: 
* - plaintiff is currently paying 
$1 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
.,576.00 
incl. 
incl. 
75.00 
750.00 
300.00 
100.00 
70.00 
400.00 
50.00 
50.00 
-0-
260.00 
-0-
50.00 
481.00 
200.00 
260.00 
* 
* 
100.00 
50.00 
8.00 
20.00 
4,800.00 
APPENDIX E 
BAKER VS. BAKER 
Civil No. 914902633DA 
PAUL BAKER LOAN 
Payment History 
DATE 
07/01/84 
07/15/84 
08/01/84 
08/01/84 
08/16/84 
09/10/84 
09/29/84 
10/20/84 
11/10/84 
11/20/84 
11/22/84 
01/14/85 
03/16/85 
11/01/87 
12/01/87 
02/07/88 
03/08/88 
12/30/91 
18 payments § 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
TOTAL: $ 
Loan begin date 02/15/84 
Loan total borrowed $98,314•00 
Loan balance $94,398.00 
APPENDIX F 
Item 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
STATEMENT OF ASSETS & (LIABILITIES) 
AND 
PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED DIVISION THEREOF 
Description 
$15,000.00 
Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way-
Mortgage on residence 
Household furnishings and 
fixtures at residence 
2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah 
1990 Ford Bronco operated 
by Mrs. Baker 17,000.00 
Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00) 
1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker 
Purchase debt on 1991 GMC 
1989 Ford Bronco 
Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco 
Horse - 2 year filly 
Horse - D.B. Cooper 
Garden, power & hand tools 
Tack for horses 
U.S. Savings Bonds 
K-plus loan no. 1 owing to 
Pacific Power 
K-plus loan no. 2 owing to 
Pacific Power 
Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents 
Loan payable to Pacific Power 
Payable to Dr. Hicks 
Payable to Olivette Furniture 
Mrs. Baker Mr. Baker 
$183,000.00 
(143,000.00) 
15,000.00 
6,000.00 
18,000.00 
(19,000.00) 
12,000.00 
(10,800.00) 
2,000.00 
1,500.00 
2,000.00 
400.00 
600.00 
(1,762.00) 
(926.00) 
(94,389.00) 
(6,700.00) 
(560.00) 
(2,000.00 
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22. Estimated attorney's fees for 
Mr. Baker 
23. Estimated attorney's fees for 
Mrs, Baker 
24. Loan payable to Defendant's 
paremts 
25. Clothing and personal effects 
each party - not valued -
NET VALUES 
Together with an equal divisi< 
retirement funds of both parties per 
Domestic Relations and other orders. 
(2,500.00) 
(2,500.00) 
(33,000.00) 
NV NV 
($15,500.00) $(43,637.00) 
n of all 401K, pension and 
appropriate Qualified 
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APPENDIX 6 
DAN BAKER v. LUJUANA BAKER 
SCHEDULE OF MARITAL ASSETS 
and 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
ESTIMATED 
FAIR MARKET 
VALUE 
$ 183,000 
6,000 
$ 60,000* 
$ 30,000 
2,000 
11,150 
12,400 
19,000 
3,500 
400 
800 
$ 328,250 
$ 328,250 
$ 143,000 
11,600 
14,000 
18,500 
1,762 
926 
6,700 
560 
2,000 
($ 199,048) 
$ 131,202 
P3 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
1 
PROPOSED 
AINTIFF 
3,000 
32,199 
15,000 
2,000 
11,150 
— 
19,000 
3,500 
400 
400 
85,649 
20,000 
106,649 
11,600 
— 
18,500 
1,762 
926 
6,700 
560 
2,000 
($ 42,048) 
$ 64,601 
DISTRIBUTION 
DEFENDANT 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
($ 
$ 
$ 
($ 
$ 
183,000 
3,000 
27,801 
15,000 
— 
... 
12,400 
— 
— 
—— 
400 
242,601 
20,000) 
221,601 
143,000 
— 
14,000 
—— 
—— 
_— 
— 
— 
— 
157,000) 
64,601 
ASSETS: 
Real Estate 
11718 S. Eureka Way 
Price acreage 
Retirement Accounts 
401(k) and ESOP 
Other Assets 
Household Furnishings 
Power and Hand Tools 
Motor Vehicles 
1989 Ford Bronco 
1990 Ford Bronco 
1991 GMC 
Horses (2) 
Tack 
U.S. Savings Bonds 
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS: 
Plaintiff's Lien on Eureka Way 
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS: 
LIABILITIES: 
Mortgage (Eureka Way) 
1989 Bronco 
1990 Bronco 
GMC 
K Plus Loan 1 
K Plus Loan 2 
Pacific Power 
Dr. Hicks 
Olivette Furniture 
SUBTOTAL LIABILITIES: 
NET MARITAL ASSETS: 
* approximate value, funds to be used to equalize distribution of 
marital estate 
Each party to pay debts incurred in his or her own name since separation 
Each party to pay any debts associated with his or her parents 
